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MODEL DEFENSE OF NEEDY
PERSONS ACT
REED DICKERSON'
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have expanded the duty of the
states to provide counsel for defendants in criminal cases. The follow-
ing statute seeks to set up a workable system of assuring the accused
the assistance of counsel early in the proceedings against him and, if
necessary, at no cost.
PREFATORY NOTE
The interest of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in needy persons accused of crime existed
long before the recent case of Gideon v. Wainwright.1 In 1959,
the Conference adopted a Model Defender Act based on careful
study and close cooperation with the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, the Standing Committee on Legal Aid
Work of the American Bar Association, and the Section on
Criminal Law of the Association: The Special Committee that
prepared that Model Act was then discharged.
Further study, made in the new light cast by recent Supreme
Court decisions, suggested the advisability of re-evaluating the
earlier work of the Conference. Accordingly, a Special Com-
mittee to Review the Model Defender Act was created by action
of the Executive Committee at the 1963 Annual Meeting. The
Model Defender Act of 1959 was withdrawn until an appro-
priate revision could be approved. An entirely new Model Act
resulted.
In carrying out its functions, the 'Committee was guided by
the views expressed by the Supreme Court in Gideon, in Escobedo
v. Illinois,2 in Miranda v. Arizona,3 and in other cases. Through-
*Professor of Law, Indiana University; author, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING (1954),
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING (1965); Commissioner for Indiana and
Chairman, Special Committee to Review Model Defender Act, National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Commissioner Dickerson was drafts-
man of the Model Defense of Needy Persons Act, approved by the Conference
August 4, 1966, the final text of which appears here. The Prefatory Note and
Comments are based on the note and comments to be published by the Conference.
Other members of the Special Committee of the Conference are Commissioners
Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Chicago; James K. Northam, Indianapolis; and Arie
Poldervaart, Albuquerque.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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out, the objective was to assure fair treatment for the needy
defendant within the bounds of what is administratively practic-
able.
In general terms, Gideon v. WJainwright gave the needy crimi-
nal defendant the same right to legal representation in a State
court under the 14th amendment (whether "equal protection" or
"due process") that the 6th amendment gives to criminal de-
fendants in federal courts.4  The minimum requirements of
representation, therefore, are to be found not only in the express
assurances made in Gideon itself but also in what the court had
previously found to be required of federal proceedings under
the 6th amendment.
According to the majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice
Black, "any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him."' Representation is assured "unless the right is com-
petently and intelligently waived" (citing Johnson v. Zerbst,0 the
first case to extend the right to counsel to needy persons). At the
same time, in Douglas v. California,' the Court extended the
needy person's right to counsel to include at least his first appeal.
As for the necessary expenses of defense other than the ser-
vices of an attorney, the Supreme Court, in Griffin v. Illinois' and
Draper v. Washington,' has already assured the needy defendant
in a federal criminal case the right to a free transcript (or its
equivalent) on appeal.
The criminal defendant's right to counsel covers every critical
stage of the proceedings against him. It includes arraignment"
and preliminary hearing." In Escobedo the Supreme Court
held that, under some circumstances at least, a person under
arrest for murder has a constitutional right to the presence of
counsel while the police interrogate him as a suspect. 2 Accord-
ingly, it threw out a confession obtained while the counsel re-
tained by the accused was excluded from the interrogation. On
the basis of Gideon and Escobedo, it seemed likely that the
4. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
5. 372 U.S. at 344.
6. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
7. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
8. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
9. 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
10. Walton v. Arkansas, 371 U.S. 28 (1962).
11. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
12. 378 U.S. at 492.
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Supreme Court would extend the same protection to needy sus-
pects.
In Miranda the Supreme Court held that once a person (in
that case, a needy person) had been taken into custody by the
police no confession, admission, or exculpatory statement made
outside the presence of counsel could be used against him, unless,
after being fully informed as to his rights, he had waived his
right to counsel voluntarily, knowingly, -and intelligently.'
From these cases, it has seemed clear that:
(i) the Supreme Court has extended to state cases the pro-
tections that it provides in federal cases;
(2) it has extended to needy persons the protections that it
provides to persons of adequate means;
(3) it has made the right to counsel absolute and not depend-
ent on particular circumstances or, except in some respects
for petty offenses, on the nature of the crime;
(4) it is interested in the suspect from the moment he is taken
into custody or comes into court to plead; and
(5) it is tending to extend its protection of needy persons to
all aspects of an "adequate defense," including necessary
facilities for investigation and trial.
The approach of the new Model Act is not to define the exact
limits of the right to an adequate defense, but to provide that,
whatever the Supreme Court says it consists of for persons of
adequate means, the needy person is entitled to the same pro-
tection and that, to the extent that he is unable to pay for it, he
is entitled to have it paid for by the state.
Also, there has been no attempt in it to codify the other
aspects of a constitutionally adequate criminal procedure. For
instance, the act says nothing about the suspect's right to remain
silent, or his right to bail. It is confined to equipping the needy
person with necessary defensive facilities. Lest anyone read a
negative implication into this limited coverage, section 16 has
been included to prevent one from arising. As a model, rather
than uniform, act it is designed for the typical state and seeks
only as much uniformity as is consistent with local conditions.
Matters most likely to vary from state to state are in brackets.
In its particulars, the Model Act follows, for the most part,
the recommendations resulting from three thorough studies, one
by a special committee of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York and the National Legal Aid and Defender
13. 384 U.S. at 478-79.
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Association;14 one by the Attorney General's Committee on
Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice;1"
and one by Lee Silverstein for the American Bar Foundation."
The act also meets the specific standards respectively promul-
gated by the special committee of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York,17 the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association,' and the Special Committee on Defense of Indigent
Persons Accused of Crime of the American Bar Association,"9
all as approved by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association.20 Consideration was also given to the Criminal jus-
tice Act of 1964"1 and to tI tentative proposals of the American
Law Institute respecting pre-arraignment procedure.2
MODEL DEFENSE OF NEEDY PERSONS ACT
SECTION i. [Definitions.]
In this Act, the term:
(I) "detain" means to have in custody or otherwise deprive
of freedom of action;
(2) "expenses," when used with reference to representation
under this Act, includes the expenses of investigation, other
preparation and trial;
(3) "needy person" means a person who at the time his need
is determined is unable, without undue hardship, to provide for
the full payment of an attorney and all other necessary expenses
of representation;
14. Ass'N. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK & NAT'L. LEGAL AID AND DE-
FENDER Ass'N., EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED (1959).
15. U.S. ATr'y. GEN., REPORT OF THE COMM. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION
oF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1963). Although directed to the federal courts, this report
is similarly pertinent to state courts.
16. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE
COURTS-A PRELIMINARY SUMMARY (1964).
17. Ass'N. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK & NAT'L. LEGAL AID & DE-
FENDER ASS'N., EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED 56. See also forthcoming ABA
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMM. ON THE PROSECU-
TION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS REP., app. A [hereinafter cited as ABA PROJECT].
18. ABA, GUIDELINES FOR ADEQUATE DEFENSE SYSTEMS 8 (1964). See also ABA
PROJECT, op. cit. supra note 17, app. B.
19. ABA, SPECIAL COMM. ON DEFENSE OF INDIGENT PERSONS ACCUSED OF CRIME
JOINTLY WITH STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID WORK REP., 88 A.B.A. REP. 225
(1963). See also ABA PROJECT, op. cit. supra note 17, app. C.
20. ABA, 1963 HOUSE OF DELEGATES PROCEEDINGS, 88 A.B.A. REP. 109-10 (1963).
See also ABA PROJECT, op. cit. supra note 17, apps. A-C.
21. 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964-).
22. ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
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(4) "serious crime" includes:
(i) a felony;
(ii) a misdemeanor or offense any penalty for which in-
cludes the possibility of confinement [for 6 months or more]
or a fine of $[Soo] or more; and
(iii) an act that, but for the age of the person involved,
would otherwise be a serious crime.
COMMENT: The term "detain" is defined in terms, drawn from
Miranda v. drizona2 3 that make it clear that the act in this respect is
co-extensive with the Constitutional requirements respecting the kind of
situation in which the needy person is entitled to be represented by counsel.
The term "expenses" is given a partial ("includes") rather than an
exhaustive ("means") definition because it is necessary only to make dear
that preparation and trial are an integral part of adequate representation.
The term "needy person" is defined to make dear that partial need and
supervening need are also included. "Undue hardship," not being sus-
ceptible to precise definition, is left to the sound judgment of the court.
Minor hardship is no reason for providing relief; unreasonable hardship
is. The term "indigente is not used, because it would suggest that only
a destitute person was entitled to free counsel or services.
The term "serious crime" is defined along the lines of Mr. Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Gideon 24 which left open the question whether
counsel was required in the case of petty offenses. The Criminal Justice
Act of 1964 excepts "petty offenses," 25 which are defined by federal
statute as "any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed im-
prisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500,
or both."2 6 Although Miranda v. Arizona recognizes no exception for
petty offenses, that case did not deal with the broad right to counsel but
only with the conditions precedent to the admissibility of a confession,
admission, or exculpatory statement.
Although the standards approved by the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association 27 recommend that confinement for any period
be considered "serious," a bracketed limitation to confinements "for 6
months or more" is included because of the differences in opinion as to
whether protection should be extended to what the Criminal Justice Act
of 1964 treats as a petty crime. The Supreme Court has not yet clarified
the matter. In the meantime, it is believed that, if a time limitation is
used to define the minimum confinement necessary to constitute a "serious
crime," a period longer than 6 months would dearly be excessive.
23. 384 U.S. at 477.
24. 372 U.S. at 351 (Mr. Justice Harlan, J. concurring).
25. 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1964).
26. 62 Stat. 684 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
27. Supra note 20.
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Through the use of the word "includes," the term "serious crime" is
given a partial definition to provide judicial flexibility in any case where
the court believes that special circumstances make the crime serious in fact
even though the legal penalties do not meet the specific criteria of this
clause.
SECTION 2. [Right to Representation, Services, and Facilities.]
(a) A needy person who is being detained by a law enforce-
ment officer, or who is under formal charge of having committed,
or is being detained under a conviction of, a serious crime, is
entitled:
(I) to be represented by an attorney to the same extent as
a person having his own counsel is so entitled; and
(2) to be provided with the necessary services and facilities
of representation (including investigation and other prepara-
tion).
The attorney, services and facilities, and court costs shall be
provided at public expense to the extent that the person, at the
time the court detemines need, is unable to provide for their
payment without undue hardship.
(b) A needy peron who is entitled to be represented by an
attorney under subsection (a) is entitled:
(I) to be counseled and defended at all stages of the matter
beginning with the earliest time when a person providing his
own counsel would be entitled to be represented by an attorney
and including revocation of probation or parole;
(2) to be represented in any appeal; and
(3) to be represented in any other post-conviction proceed-
ing that the attorney or the needy person considers appropriate,
unless the court in which the proceeding is brought determines
that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with ade-
quate means would be willing to bring at his own expense.
(c) A needy person's right to a benefit under subsection (a)
or (b) is not affected by his having provided a similar benefit
at his own expense, or by his having waived it, at an earlier
stage.
COMMENT: This section defines the right to representation generally.
Although Miranda v. Arizona defined only the earliest time when the
presence of counsel became a condition precedent to the admissibility of a
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confession, admission, or exculpatory statement, that time being the moment
the suspect is taken into custody, it is believed that this occasion also repre-
sents the time the right to counsel will be held generally to attach.
If the accused is formally charged before he is taken into custody, the
right to counsel is assured even though no confession, admission, or excul-
patory statement has been made. Counsel is necessary, for example, if the
accused wishes to plead guilty.28 Arraignment is a critical stage because
some defenses and pleas in abatement would be waived unless asserted at
that point.29 There is a strong consensus among judges, prosecutors, and
defense counsel that appointment of counsel at the earliest possible stage
is the most critical aspect of providing valuable and effective representation.
The section does not undertake to spell out all the circumstances in
which a criminal defendant is entitled to counsel. It provides only that,
whenever a man of adequate means is legally entitled to counsel, the needy
person is likewise entitled to counsel. "Legally entitled" is intended to
mean "under the law," whether constitution, statute, regulation, or ordi-
nance.
The section also makes dear that the criminal defendant is entitled to
all the necessary elements of adequate representation.
The section provides that relief is to be given only to the extent of the
need; under section 4(c) the accused must contribute as much as he
reasonably can. It also allows for relief in the case of supervening need
or change of mind about a previous waiver.
The words "at the time the court determines need" are included in sub-
section (a) to take care of the case where there is a significant change
in the defendant's financial condition between the time he receives legal
assistance and his first appearance in court (i.e., when need is determined
under section 4). If he is not needy when he receives assistance but is
needy at the time of determination, there is no point in requiring him to
pay what he is then unable to pay. (If he later becomes able to pay, he
can be required to do so under section 8(a)). Conversely, if he is needy
when he receives assistance but can pay at the time of determination, he
should be required to pay. (If he does not pay then, he will have to pay
later under section 8(b)). The same analysis applies where the change
in financial condition is one only of degree.
Clause (i) of subsection (b) follows the theme of Gideon v. Wain-
wright: the needy accused has rights of representation co-extensive with
those of a person with adequate means.
Clause (2) makes dear that the right to counsel on appeal is absolute.
This complies with Douglas v. California.
Clause (3) provides that the right to counsel in any other post-conviction
proceeding attaches unless it is found to be frivolous. It also spells out
what constitutes frivolity.
28. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
29. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
10 Harvard Journal on Legislation
SECTION 3. [Notice and Provision of Representation.]
(a) If a person who is being detained by a law enforcement
officer, or who is under formal charge of having committed, or
is being detained under a conviction of, a serious crime, is not
represented by an attorney under conditions in which a person
having his own counsel would be entitled to be so represented,
the law enforcement officers concerned, upon commencement of
detention, or the court upon formal charge, as the case may be,
shall:
(I) clearly inform him of the right of a needy person to
be represented by an attorney at public expense; and
(2) if the person detained or charged does not have an
attorney, notify the public defender, non-profit organization,
or trial court concerned, as the case may be, that he is not so
represented.
As used in this subsection, the term "commencement of detention"
includes the taking into custody of a probationer or parolee.
(b) Upon commencement of any later judicial proceeding
relating to the same matter, the presiding officer shall clearly
inform the person so detained or charged of the right of a needy
person to be represented by an attorney at public expense.
(c) If a court determines that the person is entitled to be
represented by an attorney at public expense, it shall promptly
notify the public defender, notify the non-profit organization, or
assign an attorney, as the case may be.
(d) Upon notification or assignment under this section, the
public defender, non-profit organization, or assigned attorney, as
the case may be, shall represent the person with respect to whom
the notification or assignment is made.
(e) Information given to a person under this section is effec-
tive only if:
(i) it is in writing or otherwise recorded;
(2) he records his acknowledgment of receipt and time of
* receipt, or, if he refuses to make this acknowledgment, the
person giving the information records that he gave the infor.
mation and that the person informed refused so to acknowl-
edge it; and
(3) the material so recorded under clauses (I) and (2) is
filed with the court next concerned.
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COMMENT: One of the most critical elements in the adequate pro-
tection of a needy accused is adequate notice of his legal rights respecting
counsel and representation. The section attempts to insure that adequate
information will be given him at the earliest possible moment and at each
critical stage thereafter.
When the accused does not have an attorney, the section sets the wheels
in motion for representation by providing for notification of the operating
defender agency, which is required to act upon receiving notice.
Before the accused's first appearance in court, the right to representation
does not depend on a finding that the accused is a "needy person". It is
enough that he does not have an attorney. At this stage, time is a critical
factor. Equally important, the determination of need is best made by a
judge. It should not be made by the police or by a defender. Determina-
tion by the police would impose on them an unnecessary and undesirable
burden. It would also risk undesirable delay at a stage when time may
be of the essence.
If it is later found that the accused was not a needy person, he may be
required to pay under section 4(c) or under section 8(a).
SECTION 4. [Determination of Financial Need.]
(a) The determination of whether a person covered by Sec-
tion 2 is a needy person shall be deferred until his first appearance
in court or in a suit for payment or reimbursement under Section
8, whichever occurs earlier. Thereafter, the court concerned
shall determine, with respect to each proceeding, whether he is
a needy person.
(b) In determining whether a person is a needy person and
in determining the extent of his inability to pay, the court con-
cerned may consider such factors as income, property owned, out-
standing obligations, and the number and ages of his dependents.
Release on bail does not necessarily prevent him from being a
needy person. In each case, the person, subject to the penalties
for perjury, shall certify in writing or by other record such ma-
terial factors relating to his ability to pay as the court prescribes.
(c) To the extent that a person covered by Section 2 is able
to provide for an attorney, the other necessary services and facili-
ties of representation, and court costs, the court may order him
to provide for their payment.
COMMENT: For reasons given under section 3, the determination of
need is left to the cognizant court. This does not create a gap in needed
protection, because under section 3(d) the right to an attorney arises as
soon as the defender is notified or assigned.
12 Harvard Journal on Legislation
A special provision on bail is inserted in subsection (b) because in some
jurisdictions the ability to post bond has been held to negate eligibility for
counsel at public expense. Such a position fails to recognize that bail may
have been provided as an accommodation by someone not legally obligated
to provide counsel to the accused.
To reduce the incidence of misrepresentation, the alleged needy person
is required by subsection (b) to certify, subject to the penalties for perjury,
such facts as the court considers appropriate under the circumstances.
This process need not be elaborate if the need is fairly evident, as, for
example, where the accused is already on public relief.
SECTION S. [Competence to Defend.]
No person may be given the primary responsibility of repre-
senting a needy person unless he is authorized to practice law in
this state and is otherwise competent to counsel and defend a per-
son charged with a crime. Competence shall be determined by the
court at the first court proceeding after the giving of primary
responsibility.
COMMENT: It is clear from the cases that, where the accused is
entitled to be represented by counsel, he is entitled to be represented by
competent counsel. "Competent counsel" does not mean the best counsel,
but only counsel meeting the minimum requirements of an adequate repre-
sentation in a criminal case. The attorney must be a member of the bar
with some background in criminal law, but he need not be an expert. Al-
though a law student is believed not to meet the minimum qualifications
for handling serious crimes, he is not precluded from assisting qualified
counsel in the case of a serious crime. Nor is he precluded from having the
primary responsibility for handling a non-serious criminal case, which is
not covered by this act. An assigned counsel system should be based on a
roster of experienced trial advocates.
Persons "authorized to practice law in this state" include not only persons
who are licensed by the state but persons licensed by other states who by
court order or otherwise are authorized to practice in the state.
As with the determination of need, determination of competence is left
to the cognizant court.
SECTION 6. [Substitute Defender.]
At any stage, including appeal or other post-conviction pro-
ceeding' the court concerned may for good cause assign a sub-
stitute attorney. The substitute attorney has the same functions
with respect to the needy person as the attorney for whom he is
substituted. If the substitute attorney is not in the office of the
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public defender nor in a non-profit organization serving under
this Act, the court shall prescribe reasonable compensation for
him and approve the expenses necessarily incurred by him in the
defense of the needy person.
COMMENT: This section is largely self-explanatory. Regardless of
which plan the county selects under section io, each substitution is to be
by court assignment. This system will protect the defendant while re-
maining flexible enough to meet any need to substitute, regardless of source.
SECTION 7. [Waiver.]
A person who has been appropriately informed under Section 3
may waive in writing, or by other record, any right provided by
this Act, if the court concerned, at the time of or after waiver,
finds of record that he has acted with full awareness of his rights
and of the consequences of a waiver and if the waiver is other-
wise according to law. The court shall consider such factors as
the person's age, education, and familiarity with English, and the
complexity of the crime involved.
COMMENT: Although the right to waive a right is well recognized,
it is important that a waiver of so basic a right as the right to counsel be
recognized as valid only where it is dear that the accused knows the
significance and consequences of his act. Hence the requirement that the
waiver be done voluntarily, competently and intelligently."
To make sure that an adequate foundation for a waiver is laid, the act
requires that the accused be adequately informed of his rights respecting
representation. The requirement that it be written or otherwise recorded
not only provides evidence of the act but makes clear that the mere absence
of a request for counsel, or a plea of guilty, cannot be construed as a
waiver.31
The phrase "and if the waiver is otherwise according to law" is included
because some states have adopted additional safeguards.
The last sentence is intended to make more uniform the widely varying
waiver practices among the states.
SECTION 8. [Recovery from Defendant.]
(a) The [county] attorney may, on behalf of the [county],
recover payment or reimbursement, as the case may be, from
30. Miranda v. Arizona, 384. U.S. at 478-79.
31. See Doughty v. Maxwell, 372 U.S. 781 (1963); William v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
471 (1945).
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each person who has received legal assistance or another benefit
under this Act:
(i) to which he was not entitled;
(2) with respect to which he was not a needy person when
he received it; or
(3) with respect to which he has failed to make the certifi-
cation required by Section 4 (b) ;
and for which he refuses to pay or reimburse. Suit must be
brought within 6 years after the date on which the aid was
received.
(b) The [county] attorney, on behalf of the [county], may
recover payment or reimbursement, as the case may be, from each
person, other than a person covered by subsection (a), who has
received legal assistance under this Act and who, on the date on
which suit is brought, is financially able to pay or reimburse the
county for it according to the standards of ability to pay appli-
cable under Sections I (3), and 2 (a), and 4 (b), but refuses to
do so. Suit must be brought within 3 years after the date on
which the benefit was received.
(c) Amounts recovered under this section shall be paid into
the [county] general fund, except that so far as they represent
money provided by the state under Section 12, they shall be paid
into the [general fund] of the state.
COMMENT: A recapture provision is included as subsection (a) for
three purposes: (i) to discourage misrepresentation; (2) to provide for
repayment where legal services were provided, under section 3(d), to a
person who, upon subsequent court determination, is found not to have
been a needy person; and (3) to avoid unnecessary costs to the county
or state.
Clause (2) covers the special case where a person with adequate means
but without an attorney was provided with an attorney, but for some
reason was not required to pay for his services at the time the court made
its determination of need under section 2 (a). Clause (i) is inadequate for
this purpose because before his first appearance in court an accused who
does not have an attorney is entitled to one under section 3(d), whether
he can pay or not.
A reimbursement provision is included as subsection (b) to avoid un-
necessary costs to the county or state, where within a reasonable time the
dependent becomes able to pay.
Statutes of limitation of 6 years and 3 years, respectively, are included.
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SECTION 9. [Choice of Local Program.]
(a) The [appropriate legislative authority] of each [county]
shall provide for the representation of needy persons who with
respect to serious crimes are subject to proceedings in the
[county], or are detained in the [county] by law enforcement
officers. They shall provide this representation by:
(I) establishing and maintaining an office of public de-
fender;
(2) arranging with an appropriate non-profit organization
to provide attorneys;
(3) arranging with the courts of criminal jurisdiction in
the [county] to assign attorneys on an equitable basis through
a systematic, coordinated plan and, if the [county] has a popu-
lation of more than [400,ooo] according to the most recent
decennial census, under the guidance of an administrator; or
(4) adopting a combination of these alternatives.
Until the [appropriate legislative authority] elects an alternative,
it shall be considered as having elected alternative (3).
(b) If it elects to arrange with a non-profit organization to
provide attorneys, the [appropriate legislative authority] of a
[county] may join with one or more other [counties] in arranging
with such an organization.
(c) If it elects to establish and maintain an office of public
defender, and if the [appropriate legislative authorities] and
[county courts of general jurisdiction] concerned respectively
agree on qualifications, term of office, compensation, support, and
appointment under Section Io(a), the [appropriate legislative
authority] of a [county] may join with the [appropriate legis-
lative authorities] of one or more other [counties] to establish
and maintain a joint office of public defender. In that case, the
participating [counties] shall be treated for the purposes of this
Act as if they were one [county].
(d) If the [appropriate legislative authority] of a [county]
elects to arrange with the courts of criminal jurisdiction in the
[county] to assign attorneys, a court of the [county] may pro-
vide for advance assignment of attorneys, subject to later ap-
proval by it, to facilitate representation in matters arising before
appearance in court.
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COMMENT: The section reflects the unanimous agreement among
those who have studied the subject that no single kind of administrative
system for providing attorneys is best adapted to all localities. Accordingly,
the local governmental unit is authorized to provide for representation by
(I) a public defender system, which is well adapted to the more heavily
populated areas; (2) a legal aid or other private non-profit group; (3) a
program of court-assigned attorneys, which is well adapted to the more
lightly populated areas; or (4) any combination of these. The section
also authorizes a group of local units to join in a combined program suit-
able to their common needs. This would permit, for example, two counties
that could not otherwise support a full-time public defender to have one.
If the local unit of government selects a court-assigned attorney system,
the persons administering it are required to spread the responsibility equi-
tably among the available eligible attorneys and to adopt a coordinated
system. This is intended to avoid the haphazard and inequitable aspects
of many existing programs.
In areas with large populations it has been found desirable to operate a
court-assignment system under the guidance of an administrator. Sub-
section (a) (3) so requires.
Lest the purposes of the act be defeated through a failure of the local
unit to act, it provides that, until an alternative is elected, a court-assign-
ment system is in effect.
Subsection (d) is included to help adapt the usual court-assigned attorney
system to the need to provide counsel during police interrogation before
appearance in court.
SECTION I0. [Compensation, Expenses, Term of Office, and
Appointment.]
(a) If the [appropriate legislative authority] of a [county]
elects to establish and maintain an office of public defender, the
[appropriate legislative authority] shall:
(I) prescribe the qualifications of the public defender, his
term of office (which may not be less than 6 years), and his
rate of annual compensation (which may not be less than
$ .............. a year and not proportionately less than that of the
[county prosecutor]) ; and
(2) provide for the establishment, maintenance, and sup-
port of his office.
The [county court of general criminal jurisdiction] shall appoint
the public defender from a panel of not more than 5 and not
fewer than 3 persons (if that many are available) designated
by a committee of lawyers appointed by the senior judge of that
[county] court, or from the candidates making the 3 or less
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highest scores on an appropriate merit-system examination. To
be a candidate, a person must be licensed to practice law in this
state and must be competent to counsel and defend a person
charged with a crime. During his incumbency, the public de-
fender may not engage in the practice of criminal law other than
in the discharge of the duties of his office.
(b) If the [appropriate legislative authority] of a [county]
elects to arrange with a non-profit organization to provide de-
fenders, the [county] shall reimburse the organization for such
direct expenses as the courts respectively concerned have deter-
mined to be necessary in the representation of needy persons
under this Act.
(c) If a court assigns an attorney to represent a needy per-
son, it shall prescribe a reasonable rate of compensation for his
services and shall determine the direct expenses necessary to
representation for which he should be reimbursed. The county
shall pay the attorney the amounts so prescribed.
(d) An attorney under subsection (b) or (c) shall be com-
pensated for his services with regard to the complexity of the
issues, the time involved, and other relevant considerations.
[However, he may be compensated at a rate no higher than $i
an hour for time spent in court and no higher than $io an hour
for time spent out of court, subject in each case to a maximum
total fee of $Soo in case of a felony and $300 in any other case,
unless the court concerned finds that special circumstances war-
rant a higher total fee.]
COMMENT: Where the local unit of government elects to establish
an office of public defender, this section attempts to insure that the incum-
bent will have adequate tenure and be paid as much as the local prosecutor.
(The word "proportionately" is used because the public defender may be
on a full-time basis while the public prosecutor is on a part-time basis.) A
term of office of less than 6 years would provide insufficient security to
attract career personnel and insufficient opportunity for breadth and depth
of experience. Two alternative methods of selection, each designed to
increase the chances of attracting high quality professional defenders, are
provided. If a merit-system examination is considered undesirable, appoint-
ment from a panel selected by representatives of the bar is available as an
alternative.
Although a full-time public defender is usually desirable, it is not al-
ways feasible to provide one. Accordingly, the prohibition against practicing
law on the side is limited to the practice of criminal law.
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For court-appointed attorneys, a liberal maximum fee is desirable to
allow the court some flexibility in reflecting the variations in complexity
among differing cases. An overriding maximum assures the public that its
resources are not being distributed too liberally. Although the specific
figures named in the act were drawn from the Criminal Justice Act of
1964,32 they are only suggested. Local conditions may make other figures
more appropriate.
If a legal aid or defender organization has been selected, any possibility
of exorbitant legal fees can be dealt with through the court's power, under
subsection (d), to determine the necessary direct expenses for which the
organization is entitled to be reimbursed.
SECTION II. [Personnel and Facilities.]
(a) If an office of public defender has been established, the
public defender may employ, in the manner and at the com-
pensation prescribed by the [appropriate legislative authority],
as many assistant public defenders, clerks, investigators, stenogi
raphers, and other persons as the [appropriate legislative au-
thority] considers necessary for carrying out his responsibilities
under this Act. A person employed under this section serves at
the pleasure of the public defender, unless his position is under
a civil service system in which he may be removed only for cause.
(b) If an office of public defender has been established, the
[appropriate legislative authority] shall:
(I) provide appropriate facilities (including office space,
furniture, equipment, books, postage, supplies, and interview-
ing facilities in the jail) necessary for carrying out the public
defender's responsibilities under this Act; or
(2) grant the public defender an allowance in place of
those facilities.
(c) A defending attorney is entitled to use the same state
facilities for the evaluation of evidence as. are available to the
[county prosecutor]. If he considers their use impractical, the
court concerned may authorize the use of private facilities to be
paid for on court order by the [county].
COMMENT: Subsections (a) and (b) are intended to make sure that
a public defender is adequately equipped to meet his responsibilities under
the act. Consistently with the state's civil service system, he should have
full control of his personnel.
32. 78 Stat. 553, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (196).
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Subsection (c) is intended to equalize, so far as possible, the facilities
available to the prosecutor and the defender, regardless of the defender
system under which the local unit of government is operating.
SECTION 12. [Financing of Local Program.]
(a) The [appropriate legislative authority] of each [county]
shall annually appropriate enough money to administer the pro-
gram of representation that it has elected under Section 9. If in
any fiscal year the payments made by the [county] under Section
10 are greater than ........ per cent of its annual budget, the state
shall reimburse the [county] for the amount of the excess out of
the [general fund] of the state.
(b) If the [appropriate legislative authority] of a [county]
elects to establish and maintain an office of public defender, the
[county] may accept private contributions toward the support
of his office.
COMMENT: Subsection (a) provides for the local financing of the
existing defender program, with provision for state underwriting of the
excess in situations where the aggregate financial burden on the particular
governmental unit becomes disproportionately large.
Subsection (b) is intended to ease the financial burden of maintaining
an office of public defender.
SECTION 13. [llocation of Expenses.]
(a) Subject to Section 12, any direct expense, including the
cost of a transcript [or bystander's bill of exceptions or other
substitute for a transcript] that is necessarily incurred in repre-
senting a needy person under this Act, is a [county] charge
against the [county] on behalf of which the service is performed.
(b) If 2 or more [counties] jointly establish an office of public
defender, the expenses not otherwise allocable among the par-
ticipating [counties] under subsection (a) shall be allocated,
unless the [counties] otherwise agree, on the basis of population
according to the most recent decennial census.
COMMENT: Subsection (a), in recognizing that the necessary ex-
penses of defense are not confined to the personal services of an attorney,
takes its cue from Griffln v. Illinois,33 and Draper v. Washington.3 4 These
33. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
34. 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
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cases assure the needy defendant the right to a free transcript (or its equiv-
alent) on appeal. A few states use a bystander's bill of exceptions or other
substitute for a transcript.3 5
Subsection (b) allocates expenses between counties on the basis of their
respective abilities to pay. An alternative approach would be to allocate
them on the basis of the respective number of cases handled. Even this
index would tend to follow the distribution of population.
SECTION 14. [Records and Reports.]
(a) A defending attorney shall keep appropriate records re-
specting each needy person whom he represents under this Act.
(b) The public defender, non-profit organization, or person
administering a court-assigned defender plan, as the case may
be, shall submit an annual report to the [appropriate legislative
authority] showing the number of persons represented under this
Act, the crimes involved, the outcome of each case, and the
expenditures (totalled by kind) made in carrying out the respon-
sibilities imposed by this Act. A copy of the report shall also be
submitted to each court having criminal jurisdiction in the
[counties] that the program serves.
COMMENT: The sound administration of any defender plan depends
on keeping adequate records and reports.
SECTION 15. [Representation in State and Federal Courts.]
This Act applies only to representation in the courts of this
state, except that it does not prohibit a defending attorney from
representing a needy person in a Federal court of the United
States, if:
(i) the matter arises out of or is related to an action pend-
ing or recently pending in a court of criminal jurisdiction of
the state; or
(2) representation is under a plan of the United States
District Court as required by the Criminal Justice Act of 1964
(8 U.S.C. 3oo6A) and is approved by the [appropriate
legislative authority].
COMMENT: In view of the establishment in the Criminal Justice
Act of 1964 of a defender program for the Federal courts, it seems desira-
35. E.g., ILL. APP. CT. (CRIM.)R. 2 (intermediate appellate review only); Ky.
R. CRIM. P. 12.63 (in forma pauperis), 12.70 (bystander's bill), & 12.72 (agreed
statement) ; TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. art. 40.09 (1966).
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ble that a unified defender system be permitted to operate in both state
and Federal courts if the arrangement meets the approval of both the
Federal court and the local legislative authority.3 6 Such a program is
believed to be economically expedient and practically sound.
The term "defending attorney" is believed to be broad enough to include
a public defender under section 9(a) (i).
SECTION i6. [Protections not Exclusive.]
The protections provided by this Act do not exclude any pro-
tection or sanction that the law otherwise provides.
COMMENT: The section is included to preclude any negative impli-
cation that might otherwise arise by reason of the fact that the act does
not deal with rights of the accused other than those involved in providing
adequate representation and the other elements of an adequate defense.
No inference, for example, is to be drawn from the fact that the act says
nothing about the accused's right to remain silent or his right to bail.
SECTION I7. [Severability.]
If a provision, or an application of a provision, of this Act is
held invalid, the valid provisions and applications that can be
given effect without the invalid provision or application are in-
tended to be in effect. To this end, the provisions of this Act
are severable.
SECTION I8. [Repeal.]




36. Currently several defender offices, including those in New York, Philadelphia,
Cleveland, and Kansas City, are operating in both court systems.

